This paper addresses discourse structure from the perspective of understanding. It would perhaps help us understand the na,ture of discourse relatiolls il" we better understood what units of a text. can be related to one a.nother. In Olle ma.jor theory of discourse structure, Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann &: Thompson 1988 ; Imrea.l'ter simply RS'T), the smallest possible linguistic units that can lmrtMl)ate in a rhetorical rela.tion a,re called units, and "are essentially clauses, except that clausal subjects a.nd complenlents a.nd restricte(l relative clauses are considered as parts of their host clause units rather than as sepa, rate units" [p. 248]. But both Dale and Meteer (in these proceedings) point out that rhetorical relations can appear within clausal units. (DMe's argument will be discussed at the end of" this paper.) For example, the relation that is expressed in two clauses in (1.2) is expressed in only one clause in (1.1)(from Meteer, these proceedings):
(1) 1.1 My flicking the switch caused the light to turn on.
1.2 Because I flicked the switch, the light turned on.
Similarly, Hwang & Schubert (1992) , in their work on recognizing tenq)ora.l relations among episodes in discourse, argue for a "fine structure" of discourse, in which temporal relations can be established even among episodes of' subordinate clauses. This paper points out another discourse phenomenon tllat calls fbr a "fine structure" of discourse. In passages contMning attit'udc report.s--reports of agents' beliefs, knowledge, intentions, percel)tions , etc.--rhetorical relations (:an hold such that one or more of the linguistic units involved in a relation is only l)a.rt of a sentence. 1 lit solne ca.ses, such a unit may be smaller than the smallest possible unit in RST. S1)ecifically, only the complement of an attitude report, rather than the entire sentence, might be involved in some particular relation. (An example is (2) below, which will be discussed shortly.) To make matters more concrete, we will consider short 1)assages in which an attitude rel)ort participates in a relation indicated by the cue phrase 'but', where 'hut' is I)eing used to connect clauses.
Consider the following pa.ss~ge: (2) ? Under the reading described above, the ibllowiug are the clauses participa.tiug in the relation:
Mary had never l)een introduced to Sam. [the complement of (2.1)] But she had been introduced to Derek.
Contrast (2) with (3):
(3) 3.1 John thought that Richard ha(l sta.bl)ed him iu tile ba.ck.
3.2 But John was often too suspicious of R,icha.rd.
In (3), the entire senteltces (3.1) and (3.2) pa.rticil)ate in the relation iu(|ica.ted I)y 'But'. Deciding which linguistic units are involved ith a. relation is not sulficield, f<)r understan(liug how they are related, of course. Genera.lly sl)eakiug , knowledge M)ont the world aiM/or what the speaker or writer is trying to accomplish iu the discourse (Moore ,~,: Pollack 1992) would presumably be involved in arrivillg at the actual contrasts being ]mule in (2) and (3) (or whatever sorts of relations are being ilMica.ted by 'But'). But to hol)(:~ to arrive at an understanding of such texts, an NLU system must entertain the possibility that one or more of the linguistic units involved in the rela.tiou may I)e oMy a clausM complement.
Following is another short passage in which 'but' in(licates a rela.tiotl ilivolving a.n attitu(le report. For this passage, R,ST units axe sufficiently fine-grained. The pa.ssa.ge is of interest to us here because the main clause of the second seHtence, these proceedings) have noted that more tha.u oue type of rela.tiou ca.ll simultaneously hold among elements of the discourse; we see another example of this here. In discourses presenting attitudes, because they present states, eveuts, a.ud objects as well a.s attitudes toward them, a linguistic unit can be involved in more than one kind of relatiou, possibly grouped with different units. I used "groupe(l" above for la.ck of a completely a.1)prOlMa.te t(,rm from the litera,ture. It would be good to taJk a.bout these groupiugs a.s discourse segments of th(, liuguistic structure of Grosz & Sidner's theory, to distinguish lil.guistic structure, ['tom the uou-liuguistie I)a.sis t~)r that structure. This would I)e misleading, however, because dist'ours(, is strut'tured i~, (h'osz & Sidner's theory ou the basis of iuteutions. A rhetorica.l relaJ.i<)u holdiug between pieces of a discourse, such as the one indic,~ted by 'But' in (4), does uot uecesm~rily make them into a discourse segment (see Grosz The examples given al)ove do not illustrat:e the ra,nge of l~Ossihle discourse structures in which attitude reports participa,te. I a,m curreutly auaJyziug text segmeuts (from oll-liue texts) that contain 1)oth attitude terms a,ud particular cue phrases to try to ideutif~, the various possil)ilities. My goa,1 is to develop a, mecha,nism that uses syuta,¢'tic a.ud lexicaJ knowledge to identify the segments involved in the relatiou. Without a,ccess to world a,nd/or intentional knowledge, such a lnechauism could produce only likely hyl~(~theses; the idea. is to see if information extracted by the non-discourse (:Oml~oneuts of a,u overa.ll NLU system could I)e used to constrMn processing at deeper levels (Wiebe 1990 , Bergler to a.pl~ea.r , Passonneau Litman 1993, and Hirschberg & Litma.u to a.pl)ear ea.ch address usiug one or more of synt;~ctic, lexical, orthographic, and intonatiouM iuforlma.tioll to 1)ert~rm discourse ta.sks).
In summary, in discourses with attitude reports, (A) liuguistic uuits smaller than R.ST units may be involved in a. discourse relatiou, a.ud (B) a siugle liuguistic ulfit ma.y 1)e involved in more than one kind of rela.tiou, possibly t()gether with differeut lil,guisl.i(" uuits. As mentioned a.bove, others have also noted (A) a.ud (B). Da.l(, ma.kes the il~l.et'(,st.itlg a.rgt.ment tha.t, a.mong other things, (A) and (B) suggest tha.t we should ba.uish those rhet¢M('a.l rela.tions which simply mirror underlying knowledge-ba.se rela.tions, lu ma.uy ca,ses, he poiuts out, rhetoricaJ relations are simply subject-matter relations--in esta.blishiug such rela.tious, a.ll w(, a.re rea.lly doing is identifying knowledge-base rela.tions between eutities melltioued if. the discourse. With this in mind, the fa.ct that we find ma.uy insta.m:es ()f (A) a.ud (B) is m)t surprisiug. Since various syntactic constituents evoke various ol)jects, sta.tes, aud events, it is not surprising that one can find discourse rel~ttions (mirroring knowledge-base rela.tious) tha.t iuvolve va.rious pieces of sentences.
I think that Da.le makes some very good points. As I suggested a.bove, olle finds structures such a,s the ones illustrated in this pa.per l)eca.use discourses cau pl'esel,t attitudes towards things as well as presenting those things themselves. Thus, we fiu(I rela.tions a.mong 1)a.rts of sentences evoking only the objects of attitudes, as well as ;|.l|lOllg those evoking the attitudes themselves. Further, I certainly do not disagree with Dale's suggestion that tocusing on those rhetoricM relations that are clearly not domain relations would be a, way to better understand communicative intentions.
Given a rich knowledge base, however, out of all of the possil)le knowledge-I)ase rebd, ions that can hohl among all the things evoked in a discourse, only some are iutended to be picked out as the basis for coherence. (If we allow default inference, the mmd~er of possible relations is astounding.) Hobbs (1979) , among others, argues this. As such, certain groupings of linguistic units, i.e., those evoking the things involved in these relations, axe more important than others for establishing coherence. Perhaps the ideal discourse model is one in which the process of arriving at these groupings and associated relations is governed I)y a process of intention recognition. But investigating local coherence directly--how it m;mifests itself in various contexts in naturally-occurring texts, and how non-pragmatic iuformation nfight be exploited to recognize it--could provide important constraints tbr iHteution-ba,sed models.
